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EY6AIMONIA

-ITS USE IN GREEK

Before beginning this discussion of Aristotle's position on happiness, we ought first to consider how he and other
Greek writers have used the word eUOal~OYta and what meanings have been attached to that word and its cognates.

Ad-

vancing from the early Greek writers down to Plato and Aristotle, we find that the word has undergone some very interesting changes.
The word itself is etymologically constructed of two
distinct words, both very frequently employed in Homer, eu
and Oat~wy.

This latter, Liddell and Scott tell us, is of

the same root as

Oato~al, OatYU~l, Oat~;

distributes a part."

Hence,

oat~wy

and means "one who

originally referred to

anyone. Who gave a share or portion to someone, but was properly applied to a god who gave those things which men have. oat~oye, were all of these gods.

These

oat~oye~

Homer calls them ow~~pe~ ~awy.l

were, in general, favorable beings; although

Homer occasionally speaks of a oat~wy xaxo~, a~uyepo,.2

Grad-

ually, however, by an extrinsic denOmination, the word was
applied to the part that was given to and was possessed by man.

1
2

Ode 8, 325.
Ibid. 5, 396; 10, 634.
1

2

Thus, the word became equivalent

to,~opo~.

Hector tells

EVidently these
refer to the "lot" or "share" or "due."
The meaning does not remain fixed at this point but
is further made synonymous with

~6x~,

fortune.

/

Festugiere

says:
On lit en meme temps: "Beaucoup ont
Ie coeur mauvais, mais une bonne fortune":
chez d'autres, tfle vouloir est bon,
mais ils gemissent sous Ie poids d'une
mauvaise fortune " Ie "distributeur
de parts" et la Apart Distribuee"
finissent ainsi par sejconfondre avec
~OX~ • ••• Baq..LOYlal sont dites les
qualites qu'on tient de la nature
et que fait triompher Ia Bonne Fortune (€6~uxra) (Pind. Nem I, 9-10).
Rlen d'etonnant a voir Aristophane
unlr comme deux synonymes Bar~CI)Y et
~6x~: tt selon la part assignee par le
distributeur divino ou "selon la part
fortune," c'est meme chose. 4
Thus we can trace the general evolution of the word: distributer of parts, the parts distributed, fortune.
This word in its;primitive use reveals an early existence of a predominant characteristic of the Greeks, their
intensely religious, outlook.

These gifts were given man by

the gods, beings greater than him and upon whom he was dependent.

3
4

Gradually, however, as their simplicity faded,

Ibid. 8,166
Festuglere, A.J., Contemplation et Vie Contemplative Selon
Platon, Paris, LibraIre Philosophique J. Vrin, 1936: 270.

3

the Greeks lost this outlook; and, consequently, the word
lost its original meaning.

First, it was divorced from

the gods, "a part;" then identified withftchance," "fate,"
"fortune."

Only later, as we shall see, did the philosophical

writers tend to restore the religious significations.
tle sees in this "part
€~Oal~OYra

of meaning.

f'

a s€ rOY

Aristo-

't,. 5

will be found to have a similar evolution

It means "'the good lot ;one has received. tr

Fes-

tugiere sees in the word in its earlier development a religious signification but insists that it shortly lost this
meaning.
Et, sans doute, le mot implique, dans
le principe, une id6e reli~ieuse;
cette bonne part nous a 6te distribuee
par la divinite; tout bien, tout mal
aussi, nous vient des dieux. Mals le
sens religiuex ne va pas au dela, et
il ne faut pas encore l'entendre comme une
habitation de Dieu en nous. 6
We ask further: in what did this
according to various Greek authors.

€UOal~OYra

consist

Homer, strange to say,

does;not use the word, even though he frequently employs its
constituent parts.
~lO~

to refer to a

In its place he uses the word
p~ely

material prosperity.

--~-------~-~-------

5
6

Ethica Nicomachea: ll77b •
Festugiere: Ope Cit. 271.

~A-

To these

4

material gifts Odysseus refers when he says:

~

~o~'e~eAAov tv aVOpaalV~~lO~ eTval .7
Homeric Hymns that e06a'lJ.Ovta occurs.

sea, oo~ O'c!tl~l ~UXT)V

~ar

yap

t~

If is first in the
In the address to

~e

II

Athene: xarpe,

'I

from the context, we find euoal~ovla is a type of prosperity

Ii f

lir
I'

I,ll'

I(I:

euoaltloVlT)V

8 and

and happiness resulting from the fortunate outcome of an impending war.

It is a gift not to one individual, but to the

IIU
I

'i,
;1:/
II

I

iu,Ii
II/

people in general, and consists in purely material prosperity with security from the enemy.

The word, moreover, may

apply to the good lot acquired from working the land as in

11':,
I,

I

III

the case of the peasant, Hesiod:

1,1

ii
1,1

Add to this the comment made by Robinson:
Non sunt intelligendae omnes onep~aala(,
sed eae demum, quae comittuntur contra auspiciorum disciplinam, ut verba
proxime antecedentia suadent. onep ~aalaL enim dicuntur quaevis delicta,
quibus modum 1imites a ratione positos
transi1imus. 10
We see, then, that this ia a material good:following, however,

I -------------------7
8

9

10
iiI!
II ~

'IIi!

Ode 18,138
HOmeric Hymns, 19,5.
Hesiod: Opera et Dies, 824.
Robinson, Thomas:~o~OY TOY AZKPAIOY TA EYPIZKOMENA
e Theatro Sheldonisno, Oxonii, 1'/3'/. p. -;09. Commentary
to line 827 of the text.

5

upon certain moral observances accompanying the working of
the land.

Pindar aSBociates happiness with the honor and

glory of physical prowess conjoined with the prosperity of
one's children.

'ronis is evident in his tenth Pythian Ode:

€06at~wv ~e xat ~~v~~~~ oJ~o~ aVDP ytyve~a,
o~ av xepatv ~ ~o6wv aQe~~ xpa~~aal~
~a ~eYla~'aE9Awv
eA~ ~OA~~ ~e xat agevel,
M
,

xal

xa~

N

,

~

Veapov
alaav 610V 16~ ~oxov~a
~WhlV

7-

E~L

'~M

#

,

a~e<pavwv

#.

11091WV.

However, he also recognized the inability of honor, eating,
and sensual pleasure to satisfy, thus admitting that something more is needed. 12 Solon requires a large number of;conditions for one to be happy.
childre~good

The city must be at peace; the

and fair to behold; there must be sufficient

wealth to allow the individual to live according to the norms
of the day; his death must be glorious; and he must be commemorated with national honors.

Herodotus quite frankly iden-

tifies eu6al~ovta with wealth, and the eu6at~ove, are those
who can afford beef, horses, and lamb on the occasion of their
birthdays.1S

ElseWhere, he speaksjof the h~py states which

fall and the;poor states which rise; thus seeming to mean
those possessing wealth as contrasted with those in poverty.14
Thucydides finds no trouble in grouping the

11
12
13
14

Pindar: Pythian Odes, x, 22-26
Pindar: Nemean Odes, vii, 8S.
Herodotus: L, l~
Herodotus: L, 5.

eu6at~ove~

among

6

the rich who were able to afford costly tunics and adorn
themselves with gold. 15
It is not until we come to the dramatists that we find
happiness assuming the form of a moral condition.

Sophocles

says: "They are the happy Who have never known evil."16

That

this evil is religious can be seen from the rest of the strophe.

Jebb interprets

crercr9~

geogev

as follows:

Sin, a~a, likened to a storm or earthquake, that shak e s a building. When
a sin has once been cOmmitted, and the
shock of divine punishment has once been
felt • • • .17
Friendship with the gods :occasioned by one's being rightminded (eu~pwv) seems to be the reason why Aeschylus is not
averse to calling Cyrus

I'
euoal~wv

"
18
aVDP.

The philosophers are the first really to hit upon the
notion of happiness as it should be understood according to
its essence.

Plato proposes the question in various places

but primarily in the Gorgias.
~ovra

There we find him using

very frequently, endeavoring to define it.

euoa~

Of the King

of Persia he says; ouo~ ~ov ~eyav ~4alAEa • • • e6oat~ova
ov~a19,

15
16
17

18
19

and he adds further along in the argument the reasoH:

Thucydides: I,6.
Sophocles: Antigone, 582
Jebb, Richard Sophocle~ Plays and Tragedies: Pt. III, Antigone. Cambridge: University Press, Note to 583.--Aeschylus: Persae, 768, 773.
Plato: Gorgias, 470 e

7

wealth, power, riches in general are not sufficient to declare
a man happy.

Continuing, he says:
~ov ~~v

xaA~v ~~t aya90v avBpa xaf
euBai~ova e(vai ~~~l, ~ov B~
~5lXOV ~ar ~ov~pov a9AlOV.

yap

yuvarxa

Plato allows no doubt to remain about the meaning of euBal\-Lovia.

Ii. man may have all the wealth in the world; but un-

less he has these virtues, he is not euBai\-Lwv.
u

public he repeats once more:
euBa£\-Lwv, ~ B~ ~~'~'avav~ia.
...
~W~

asks:
\-Lwv,

t

0

~wv

#

#

•

xal

\-Laxap~o~ ~e

To this assertion Thrasymachus

»

~

y_

,.

ye eu

0

In his Re-

t

~.

~,

1

#

yu.p ou; Socrates answers: 0 ~t;V Bl)<.alo~ apa euBal"\
21
B,»aBtxo~ a9Alo~.
But to Aristotle is left the task
~,

of defining the essence of happiness.

In his Ethica Nico-

machea he defines euBal~OVra.::
~O &v9pw~i
vov#
.
I'

~al

~a~

cl.ya90v wuxiii evepye ta yi veel B~ ~Aelou~ at ape~al,
~.,

,

ape~~v,

,

#

~a~a ~~v ~eAe,o~a~~v ~af apicr~~v.
-

Elsewhere he says: Boxel B

, 1

u

,

#

euBa.l~wV

#

1 ,

~

PlO~ xa~ ape~'1v

,.

elval.

23

In the Politics 24 as well as in the Ethics~ euBal~oviais
identified wi th eu~payr a and e3' i';Tjv.

There is no doubt left

that Aristotle has forsaken the earlier notions of happiness,
consisting largely in material welfare, and transferred the
word to its proper sphere, that of activity of the higher part

-------------------20
21
22

23
24

Ibid.
ReKublic: 354 a

Et • Nrc.,

l098 a

IOfd.;-!177 a

Politics, l325 a , l33lb

s
of man.

He does not completely divorce e6oa,~ovra from~uXD,

but makes the latter very secondary.
All that we have seen can be briefly summarized as follows.

Although originally signifying an internal quality

given by a go d or geni us,

I '
€uoa,~ov,a

1 ost that meaning by the

time of the Homeric Hymns and was used by the earlier Greeks
to represent material prosperity and wealth.

Plato and Aris-

totle revived the original notion, an internal condition,
and crystallized it by Showing it was Virtue, or activity in
accordance with virtue.

They emphasized the intrinsic quality,

but nowhere do they exclude good fortune.

Hence, it ought

to be said that, with the emphasis placed upon the notion of
activity, they wed both concepts into the one term: good fortune, moral goodness; wealth and weal.

CHAPTER II
ARISTOTLE CONCLUDES TO

P~PPINESS

In setting himself the task of exploring the field of
Politics (which he makes the "master-craft" embracing Ethics l ),
Aristotle merely follows in the paths of Greek thought; for
all the great thinkers from Homer down to his own teacher,
Plato, considered they had the task of treating this topic.
Solon, Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, Leucippus, Democritus are a
few of the great names associated with this topic.

The poets,

too, had their representatives such as Sophocles, Euripides,
Aeschylus, Pindar, and Sappho.

These mention the topic only

in passing words; but, nevertheless, their treatment presupposes a vast amount of thought on the question.

Aristotle,

in fact, followed every son of Hellas, for each one was concerned with these problems: "\Y.ny do I exist?
the sense of obligation?

Why do I have

What is it that I am constantly seek-

ing?"
For the divining mind of Aristotle, there is little
hesitancy in answering the question underlying each of these
problems: man does all this for one purpose, to be happy, to
1

Eth. Nic. 1094 a , 24. "Now it would be agreed that it [the Suo
preme-nood, the subject of Ethics and Politics] must be the
object of the most authoritative of the sciences - some
whience which is pre-eminently a master-craft. But such
is manifestly the science of Poli tics."
9

10
attain the end for which man exists.

In the Ethica Nicomachea~
i

with little time spent on the answers to those problems offered by preceding thinkers, he passes on to the answer offered

.~hefore

but thought out anew for himself.

That answer

is happiness.
His reason for concluding to the fact that happiness
must be the answer to these problems faced by Ethics is solidly founded on the principle that everything must have an end.
Basing his argument on the

soundapx~

established by himself in

the Politics that "nature does nothing in vain,"3 and that this
object which nature intends must be a good,4 he concludes
that the good aimed at by one's actions must be a good which
is desirable in itself and not for something else.
be an ultimate good.

It must

This is the case; otherwise, the inten-

tions of the agent would proceed

e[~

anelpov.

Through an ar-

gumentum ad hominem, it is obvious that this good is happiness;
though in what it consists, Aristotle must better define.
This much without further ada, Aristotle is able to say
about happiness.

It fulfills the requirements set down by the

preliminary argunmnt.

It is a good (which all admit) and it

is ultimate; certainly ultimate or final, for everything
else that man does is sub-ordinated to it; whereas it is sub2
3
4

Ibid., l095b , 12-1097 a , 14.
Pol.,1253 a , 9. (069tV yap ~ ~UOl~ nOlel ~a~~v.)
Ern. ~., l094a , 3.

II

ordinated to none.
Now such a thing happiness, above all
else is held to be; for this we choose
always for itself and never for the sake
of something else, but honour, pleasure,
reason, and every virtue we choose indeed for themselves • • • but we choose
each of them also for the sake of happiness, judging that by means of them
we shall be happy.5
In addition, happiness is self-sufficient, that is, it
is the most desirable of all goods and lacking in nothing.
Aristotle conceives of this self-sufficiency as consisting in
two things.

First, that it be perfect happiness irrespective

of parents, sons, or friends.

It is not necessary that these

persons should have to contribute to the state of happiness
either by adding some element to that state such as companionship; or by receiving something from the happy man such as
wealth, advice, or further learning.

On

the other hand, it

must be self-sufficient from the material Side, needing neither wealth, good-health, nor other material goods except in
a slight degree for its maintenance.

That some are required,

Aristotle admits, but merely as a condition and not as a cause
which would enter intrinsically into happiness.
At this point, it may be mentioned that Aristotle comes

5

Ibid., l097b ,l. (All translations from Aristotle are those
made by W.D. Ross.)

12
• oharacteristic of happqQpiness insisted upon by Christian

1.." S Happiness musa pst be a status stabilis et qui-

~loBOP.u.., •

- . !ttl!!. in which all deSSesires are supplied and anything

~d to complement the ~ature of man i. not lacking.7Fur-

..rao re ,

in his explanatiool- on of the self-sufficiency of hap-

~e8B, Aristotle is mindf~~ul of the fact that happiness is

.t just one good placed

at~~t the side of honors, riches, health,

14 beauty, but like a cate:e;:::Jegory which includes simultaneously

.1

of the minor goods.

Ju'O'smes A. Stewart

8

is partly correct

I biB analogy of Aristotlee.J. e t s concept of happiness to Plato t s
~ of Godd.

r them •

There is a ~ great similarity between the two

The individual goo~ood has its being only through its

trt1c1pation in the being
~ elements of happiness

~ of the Form of good.

The indivia-

bd have their being only because of

,,11' participation in hapIXlopiness.

But Stewart errs in two

I~ts in claiming Aristotl!~le ~virtually maintains all that Plato

.-tended for in his doctril~ine of the Idea of the Good." First,
~art considers happineseee9S as the Form of man. 9 If this were
r-----.--~--~------

.,-

rat. Thomas Aquinas: S~a Theologica: li2 ae , q.4,art.4;art.8.
liPBth •. Nic. l097b , 8-22
.. l£iwart," J .A.: Notes on Q The Nic. Eth., Clarendon Press Ox,~tord, l892,2vols.: !,9Sg5 - 9S . - ,
,""Ib1d. 95: "It is the Foofi!i'orm and organization of man t s powers
md opportunities" and e::3 e~5aq10vta. is life."

13

true, then Stewart would have to reconcile the contradictory
notes in Plato's Forms and the rorms or Aristotle.

For Plato's

Forms are subsistent, separated rrom all else,lO whereas Aristotle maintains that happiness is a single entity in each individual and hence numerically multiple.
to Stewart's contention that

h~piness

Now, with regard

is mants Form, he has

the problem or explaining how Aristotle could hold that happiness is the rorm or man and at the same time the operation
or this rorm.

For in the rirst book11 we rind that happiness

is the "activity or the soul in accordance with virtue."
Aristotelian language, the soul is the rorm or man.

In

The ac-

tivity or the aoul must be accomplished through some raculty
or the soul.

This raculty and its activity must be accidents

inhering in the substance and yet really distinct rrom the
substance.

In this case the activity would be an accident,

distinct rrom the soul, yet inhering in it.

Hence, happiness

is at least once removed rrom the soul and in no wise the soul,
or rorm, itselr.

Supposing, rurther, that stewart were right

in maintaining that happiness is the soul.
al

He has the addition-

problem or showing that Aristotle held that the soul was a

separately existing being, the Form or Idea, such as

P~ato

hold.
Stewart is drawn into this discussion or the Form or
----~---------------

10
11

Plato: Republic: 5l4 a - 51g e •
Eth. Nic. l09sa 17.

would

14

happiness in an endeavor to explain the seemingly difficult
text 12 wherein Aristotle insists that happiness should not
be reckoned as one among the rest of the goods.

A much more

simple explanation than that offered by Stewart, and one which
saves Aristotle's other doctrines can be found.

Aristotle does

not claim that the happiness of man cannot be augmented by
material goods; nor that, entitatively, happiness contains all
these other goods. He merely wishes to claim for happiness
the allaying and quieting of man's reasonable desires. 13
Leaving the discussion as it stands, we pass on to Aristotle1s further analysis of happiness.

12

Ibid. l097b , 16. e~l ~e naY~mY alpe~~a~~y ~~ cruyap,e~Ou
~ey~y 6~ 6~AO~ w~ aipe~~epay ~e~a ~ou eAaxicr~ou ~wy ayuemy· unepox~ yap ayue~y riye~u, ~~ ~pocr~,ee~eyoy, ayueWy
6~ ~O ~er~OY atpe~W~ePOY

13

It remains to be seen

aet:

St. Thomas Aquinas: In Decem Libros Ethicorum Aristotelis
Ad Nicomachum EXtOSit10, Ed. Pirotta-Gliiet, Turin, Italy,
~rietti, 1934:
ec. 9, 115-116. "Aliquid autem dicitur
etirun solitarium, vel nullo alio connumerato, esse sufficiens, in quantum continet omne illud, quo indiget homo
ex necessitate.
"Et sic felicitas de qua nunc loquitur habet de se sufficientiam, quia in se continet illud quod potest homimi
advenire. Unde potest melior fieri aliquo alio addito.
Non tamen remanet desiderium hominis inquietum quia desiderium ratione regulatum, quale oportet esse felicis, non
habet inquietudinem de his quae non sunt necessaria, licet
sunt possibilia adipisci. Hoc est ergo quod dicit maxime
inter omnia convenire feliCitate, quod etiam ipsa non connumerata aliis sit eligibilis.
"Tamen si connumeretur alicui alteri in minimo bonorum,
manifestum est, quod erit eligibilior, cuius ratio est
quia per appositionem fit superabundantia, vel augmentum
boni. Quanto autem aliquid est magis bonum, tanto est
eligibile."

15

in what the Philosopher believes this final end of man consists;
what element it is that must be superadded to man's nature
to call him happy.

There are only two steps more to take in

the positive direction.

Then, to conclude his arguments, Aris-

totle, by a negative approach, gives his reasons for refusing
to accept those quallties which illustrious men before him have
termed happiness.
It has already been stated, in discussing Stewart's
interpretations, that Aristotle considers man's happiness consists in the "active exercise of the soul in conformity with
excellence or virtue; or, if there be several human excellences
or virtues, in conformity with the best and most perfect among
them."

NOw, this passage needs further explanation, but first

we ought to see the principles Aristotle employs to make the
statement.
The argument is founded upon man's functions.

Since

the end of a being, Aristotle argues, can be achieved only
through its operation, the end proper to a being can be ascertained only from that operation which is proper to the being.
Now, the only operation or function proper to man and distinguishing him from the animals is that of his soul.

Therefore,

happiness should be sought in the use of the faculties of the
soul.

Since each man has those faculties, whether he use them

or not, each must exercise them to be called happy.

He must

reduce the potencies to actuality and actively produce a new

16

being in his make-up.

This new being or act is called happiness

But Aristotle is wisely aware of the fact that, since man possesses a free will, he is able to use the faculties in a way
repugnant to his own nature, and thereby render himself unhappy.

This explains why the exercise of the faculty must be

in conformity with excellence or virtue.

So we find that the

function of the soul, the only faculty proper to man, yields
h~piness

provided that it is used in confommity with the laws

man's nature demands; or, in other words, in accordance with
virtue.
It would be out of place here to discuss how virtue is
determined and by the use of what means the faculty is brought
into conformity with virtue.

It must be sufficient for the

present to show why such a conformity is necessary.

The facul-

ty, we have seen, must operate according to the nature of man
in order that the end of man can be achieved.

Since virtue

is the regulation of mants actions so as to make them conform
with his natUre, it follows logically that the virtue Which
regulates the action of the highest faculty of man will bring
that faculty into harmony with his nature and in that way will
direct the faculty to happiness.
A further question presents itself to Aristotle's mind
when he looks at the words,"active exercise" and tithe best
and most perfect among the virtues."

What is this exercise?

What must be exercised and in confOrmity with which virtue?

17

It is in the tenth book of the Ethics that he finally sives
an answer to these questions.

It must be the exercise of the

intellect of man in conformity with all virtue in contemplating
truth in Which happiness is to be had.
That which is proper to each thing is
by nature best and most pleasant for
each thing; for man, therefore, the
life according to reason is best and
pleasantest, since reason more than
anything else is man. This life, therefore, is also the happiest. 14
Just how does Aristotle come to the conclusion that
the life of the intellect is the source of happiness?

The

life of the intellect is the life of the noblest faculty
of man.

The soul in man's body raises him to a level which

the beasts can never reach.

The soul with its own functions

determines the specific difference between man and brute,
making man essentially superior.

Since, then, the soul and

its activities are proper to man, it is right that the faculties of the soul be proclaimed the highest.

On the other

hand, the objects of reason are the best of knowable objects.
They embrace not only sensible objects (known per accidens),
but also immaterial objects and always under the form of truth.
Again, intellectual activity is the most continuous and most
self-sufficient of all man's activities; most continuous "since
we can contemplate truth more continuously than we can do anything;u15 most self-sufficient,
------~-------------
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for while a philosopher, as well as
a just man or one possessing any other
virtue, needs the necessaries of life,
when they are sufficiently equipped
with things of that sort the just
man needs people towards whom and with
whom he shall act justly, and the temperate man, the brave man, and each of the
others is in the same case, but the
philosopher, even when by himself, can contemplate truth, and the better the
wiser he is; he can perhaps do so better
if he has fellow workers, but still he
is the most self-sufficient. 16
Finally, Aristotle claims that the activity of the intellect
is the most pleasant of virtuous

activit~es.

On five scores,

then, Aristotle pleads his cause for intellectual activity.
This activity is happiness in view of its own nature, the nature of its object, the continu9ty and self-sufficiency of
the action, and, finally, the pleasure accompanying the action.
In addition, Aristotle settle for us the problem of
the objectum formale of reason in its enjoyment of happiness.
In the tenth book of the Ethics he says:
If happiness is activity in accordance
with virtue, it is reasonable that it
should be in accordance with the highest virtue; and this will be that of the
best thing in us. Whether it be reason
or something else that is this element
which is thought to be our natural
ruler end guide and to take thought
of things noble and divine • • • the
activity of this in accordance with
its proper virtue will be perfect happiness. That this activity is contemplative we have already aaid. 17
16

Ibid.

29.
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As this statement stands, Aristotle merely proves that contemplation is happiness.

If we remember, however, his dis-

cussion in the sixth book concerning intellectual virtues, we
can see that it is philosophic wisdom; for there he says:
But again it [practical wisdom] is not
supreme over philosophic wisdom, i.e.,
over the superior part of us, any more
than the art of medicine is over health. 18
A paraphrase of these two quotations will clarify Aristotle's
position.

The argument would run something like this if ar-

ranged in a sorites.

"Practical wisdom is not superior to

philosophic wisdom; therefore, philosophic wisdom is the
highest activity.

But, contemplation is philosophic wisdom;

therefore, contemplation is the highest activity.
the highest activity is
happiness. tf

h~piness,

Now, if

then, contemplation is

Hence, to be happy, a man must contemplate both

scientific knwledge and intuitive intelligence as regards the
things of the most exalted nature; he must

~not

only know what

follows from the first principles, but must also possess truth
about the first principles;,,19 he must be a lover of wisdom,
a philosopher, who does not hesitate to embrace as matter of
consideration all the realms of being; he must search out the
fonts of knowledge, grasp hold of the formal, material, efficient, final, and exemplary causes of all things and examine
them.
-~-------~---------~

18
19

Ibid. 114Sa, 6.
Ibid. 1141a, 16.
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We are in a position now to point out in a few words
an accurate description of happiness.

This Zeller has done

for us.
The happiness of man can, in fact, consist
only in his activity, or more accurately
in that activity which is p~oper to him
as man. What kind of activity is this:
Not the general vital activity, which
he shares even with plants; not the sensitive activity, which belongs to the
lower animals as well as to man; but the
activity of reason. Now the activity of
reason, in so far as it is rightly performed, we call virtue. The proper happiness of man consists, therefore, in
virtuous activity or, in as much as there
are several sueh, in the noblest and most
perfect of these. But this is the theoretic or pure activity of thought. For
it belongs to the noblest faculty and
directs itself to the highest object;
it is exposed to the least interruption,
and affords the highest pleasure; it is
least dependent on foreign support and
external expedients; it is its own aim
and object, and is valued purely for its
own sake; in it man arrives at rest and
peace, while in the military and political, or in the practical life generally,
he is ever restlessly pursuing ends which
lie outside the activity itself. Reason
is the Divine in us. It is the true essence of the man. The pure activity of
reason can alone perfectly accord with his
true nature. It alone can afford him
unconditional satisfaction, and raise
him above the limitations of humanity
into the life of God. Next to it comes
moral activity, which thus constitutes
the second essential element of happiness.
Inasmuch, however, as it is the Divine
in man which is called into exercise
in thought, the latter may be regarded
as a superhuman good; whereas moral virtue
is in an especial sense the Good of Man. 2l

-------------------21 Zeller, Edward: Aristotle

And The Earlier Peripatetics,
tr. by Costelloe, Mu!rfiead;-London, Longmans,Green, 1897;
v. 2 141-144.

CHAPTER III
ARISTOTLE CONSIDERS ADVERSARIES
Aristotle, as we have seen, arrives at the conclu
sion that happiness must consist in the active operation
of the highest of man's faculties in accordance with virtue,
and that this operation is proper to the intellect in contemplation of truth.

This can be put down as the thesis ex-

pounded and proved in the Nicomachean Ethics.
that the

~estion

But he knows

is left incompletely handled unless he con-

siders those men who have set up other standards of happiness
contrary to his own.

Hence, he must cohsider each of the major

adversaries to his thesis and reject them one by one.

Among

these, the most famous is Plato to whom Aristotle devotes most
time.

Plato had evolved a system which contained flaws and

imperfections.

To these imperfections, Aristotle has recourse

in his refutation.
The great leader of the Academy had, from the beginning,
concerned himself with ethical questions: the problems of right
and wrong, justice, pleasure, the state as the protector of
human welfare and happiness. In the endeavor to settle the
problems which arose, Plato had recourse to his system commonly
referred to as the Ideas or Forms.
ciate Aristotle's

ar~ents,

To understand and appre-

one must first get some notion of
21
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what Plato meant and intended by his Ideas or Forms - a task
which is none too easy because Plato himself was not altogether
clear, and because Platonic interpretations of the Academy
have colored our

underst~ding

of its leader's meaning.

But

we shall try to become acquainted with the fundamental notes
of the Ideas from the primary sources, Plato's own words.
First, then, why did Plato construct such a system?
Throughout all of his discussions, certain fundamental problems constantly recurred: the problem of the one and the many,
that of becoming and being, the unity of being, the concepts
of Justice end Good.

Furthermore, he had the epistemological

difficulties of knowledge, reality, learning, sensation, and
intellection.

He faces, in the

~,

the problem of education

and the mind's ability to grasp reality.

As a test case, So-

crates asks Meno for a definition of virtue.

For an answer,

he receives an enumeration and description of virtue in a
man, woman, child, slave, and "many others."

Socrates notes

the fact that this is not definition but merely a catalogue.
He WaRts essences.

Again, in the Phaedo the question arises

whether our sense are trustworthy.

This Simmias denies.

then," asks Socrates, "does the mind attain to truth?

"How,

To what

is the mind adaequated that it may be sure it knows externals2"
To all of these answers there is only one solution for Plato the Forms.
What, then, does Plato consider to be the notes of the
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Forms?

In no place does he actually in a systematic scheme

give us this information as Aristotle would.
notes when discussing various virtues.

But he gives the

As a by-product of

the Symposium, Plato seeks to know what beauty is and claims
that it is an Idea.

Then he describes this Idea as follows:

First always existing and neither cOming
to be nor being destroyed, neither increasing nor waning, secondly not beautiful in one way and base in another,
nor beautiful in one aspect and base in
another, nor beautiful now and base
again so that it is beautiful to some
and base to others; nor again to one
(initiated) would the beautiful appear
as a guise, as hands or any other part
which the body shares, nor as a description or knowledge, nor as being somehow
or other in another, as in a living
being or in the earth, or in the heaven
or in some other thing, but being itself,
in itself, with itself, a single form
always existing, and all other beautiful things sharing in it in some such
way that although the other things become and are destroyed in no wise does
it bec~me more or less or suffer anyth1tng.
In no other place does Plato list so many notes of the Essences.
First, we find that eternity and immutability are absolutely
necessary to the Forms.

They are, in all respects, unchangeable

The necessity of this note can be easily appreciated when one
remembers that problems of change and stability must be answered
Again, the beautiful must be wholly beautiful, "wi thout blemish

1

Symposium: 2lla, f. (All translations of Plato are those
made by Jowett.)
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or stain;" it must be beautiful at all times, in all places
end for all beholders.

It must be an absolutely existent being,

whose existence is separated from all other beings, and it
must have no contact with the individual Wherever it may chance
to exist.

Furthermore, the individual beings obtain their

entity from a participation in these Forms.

Plato does not

state definitely what this participation is although in the
Symposium he claims it is ~eee~lq. In the Phaedo 2 he tells us
that this sharing may happen in three ways: through
or actual presence of the Form in the individual,

~apouora,

~eee~l',

and

,

)('OlVCJ.)Vl<l..

In addition, as Plato indirectly states in many of the
dialogues, the Ideas have a threefold aspect: ontological,
teleological, and logical or epistemological.

The first con-

cerns the objective reality of the Ideas. They are actual,
real substances 3 existing separated from everything else. That
they are substances there can be no doubt; for besides the
passages just referred to in the Phaedo and Republic, Plato
gives us in the Phaedrus 4 the beautiful allegory of the pleasure the gods have while observing the Essences (ouotal).
These essences exist in the highest part of heaven, and the

2
3
I

Phaedo: IOOd.

IbId: 78d; Repub., 514a, ff.
Phaedrus: 247a, ff.
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happiness of the gods consists in the clarity with which they
contemplate these Essences.

Man, too, strives to view these

beings; but, because of the jogging of the horses and chariots,
he gets only an imperfect knowledge of the Essences.
to earth where knowledge consists in

ava~v~al~,

Man falls

a remembering

or recollection of What had been seen in the heavens in a previous life.

There can be no doubt that thus the Ideas are on-

tological beings; in truth, they are substances existing separated from all other beings, even separated from themselves.
This last Plato reiterates in the Parmenides.
With respect to the epistemological side of the Ideas,
we see in this same passage of the Phaedrus, along with the
discussion of learning propounded in the Meno 5 , that growth
in knowledge is a matter of remembering what man has seen in
his pre-natal state of existence where, without the body, the
soul beheld the Essences or Ideas.

Plato tells us that hap-

piness consists in the clear vision of these Ideas, in the
knowledge and contemplation of justice, love, truth, and good
in general. For in the Phaedo we are told that death is a boon
to the philosopher, and that the pursuit of philosophy is but
a practice for death.

And when death comes, it is merely an

introduction to a life of happiness Which consists in renewed
contemplation of the Ideas.
The third aspect of the Forms is teleological.
6

Meno: 81c, ff.

Briefly,
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dized, nevertheless, he boldly pronounoed his decisions.
Taney's law practice in Frederick continued to grow, so that he was
able, after five years, to marry and establish a home of his own in
He married Anne Phoebe Key, siter of Francis Soott Key.

Frederi~

The Taney home,

while not at all pretentious, still stands today on Bentz Street. 26

On the

front of the house, near the doorway, is a tablet, bearing this inscription:
In This House Lived
Roger Brooke Taney
Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court
of the United States
and his Wife,
Anne Key Taney,
Sister of
Francis Scott Key
Author of
"The Star-Spangled Banner"
The Taney home was a happy and harmonious one.
happy and most tortunate" one for Taney.

"It seems

The marriage was " a
probabl~,

in

vi~

of his

fragile health and easily shattered nervous system, that his long life and
professional achievements would have been impossible without the solicitous
care and devotion of his wife and daughters who were born to them.n27

That

Taney loved his family and home is Shown by his frequent letters to his
wife and children.

He also referred to them in letters to others.

The

26nOn April 15, 1930, the home of Roger Brooke Taney in Frederick, Md., was
opened as a national shrine. •• Already the little home, with its quaint
old wine cellar and slave quarters, has been visited by thousands ot tourists from all parts of the United States. Within the first few weeks visitors also registered from Germany, Sootland, China, and Denmark." Delalpaine, Edward S., "Visiting the Taney Home", Nation~!Republic, Vol. 18,
Sept., 1930, 20.
27Swisher, 50.
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find that there are at least three notes proper to good: it
is the object of desire; it is self-sufficient; and it is
measure.

With regard to the first, Plato tells us that it is

the goal of all wish, action, and art.
For the sake of good, then, those who
do, do all these things • • • fherefore, do we admit that we do not want
that which we do for the sake of something, but that we want the thigg for
which we do it,?7
If you recall, we think that all things
ought to be done for the sake of the good • • •
and do you agree with us that the end of
all deeds is the good, and that for
its sake all other things should be
done and not it for the sake of the
rest? Yes. 8
It is the object of all nature and desired by all types of
being: the rational, the irrational, the animal, the plant,
by the whole universe.

Plato begins by asking for the good

that man desires and ends up by claiming that the entire
world with all its categories of being seeks it.

He becomes

more definite in the Philebus when he says that "every intelligent being pursues it

the good

catch it and get possession of it."9

desires it, wishes to
From these passages there

can be little doubt that Plato considered the good as the
ultimate end of man, even though he may not state the fact as
clearly as Aristotle does.
The second note proper to the good is self-sufficiency.
Gorgias: 468b.
Ibid. 49ge.
Philebus: 20d.

----------------~---

7
8
9
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Again in the;Philebus Plato writes:
Must the class of good be perfect or not
perfect? Certainly, the most perfect of
all things, Socrates. But in what? Is
the good sufficient? How can it be otherwise? And in this it surpasses all other
things. lO
By the notion of self-sufficiency, Demos tells us Plato intends
a causal category; to be self-sufficient
is to be master of one's destiny. The
good man ia unaffected by the vicissitudes of life even by the death of those
nearest to him (Repub. 387d). He is independent of his surroundings; as far
as is possible to man, his actions as
his beliefs are self-determined. The
immortal soul moves, but is not moved
by, other things; it is self-moving.
Self-sufficiency is also a formal notion. To be self-sufficient is not to
require anything else and so to be definite. Thus worth consists in "initselfness" or self-hood. Now, in so
far as sonsthing is definitely "this"
and not "that, II it is really real.
The notion of self~sufficiency merges
into that of the really real. In sum,
worth attaches to being, sim~liciter;
and anything, in so far as 1 really is,
is good. It is good to be. ll
We referred to the good as being the measure of all
things.

This characteristic takes us back to the teleological

aspect of the Forms.

In Plato's scheme of "creation," the

good is the supreme Idea, the pattern and the cause of 811
beings beneath it.
10
11

God, in this scheme, must make creatures

Ibid.
Demos: Ope Cit. 53.
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in conformity with the pattern of good.

Furthermore, Plato

maintains that the Ideas suffer no influence or change beeause
they are absolutely independent of the world and of themselves.

Therefore, this would hold true of the Idea of good.

On the other hand, the good is the cause of man's cognitions
end intellection in an efficient way because it is the cause
of the shadows within the cave.

Finally, it is toward the Idea

that man turns in an endeavor to grasp truth and perfect reality.

It is man's nature not to spend his entire life gazing

at the shadOWS, but rather to tear himself away from them and
turn towards the bright true light of the good.
summed up in this locus classicus 12

Thus, we find

the three large aspects

of the Idea of good - the ontological, the logical, and the teleological.
In the sixth book of the Republic we find them again
mentioned.

There, in discussing knowledge, Socrates builds

up his explanation upon an analogy between the sun and sensatIons; the good and intellectual perception.
Is it not also true that the sun is
not Vision, yet as being the cause
thereof is beheld by vision itself •
• • • ThiS, then, you must understand
as what I meant by the offspring of
the good which the good begot to stand
in a proportion with itself: as the
good is in the intelligible region to
reason and the objects of reason, so
is this in the visible world to vision
~d the objects of vision. 13
12
13

Re ub: 514aO 519c.
Ib d. 508b.
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After stating the similarity between the function of the Form
of good and the sun, Socrates proceeds to a fuller explanation
of the work of the good.
This reality, then, that gives their truth
to the objects of knowledge, and the power
of knowing to the knower, you must say
is the idea of good, and you must conceive it as being the cause of know1ege
and of truth in so far as knoWR; 14
This much Plato has to say about the Form of good with its
epistemological reference to manls intellect.

Note, however,

that underlying the entire explanation is a:presupposition
that the Form of good, just like the sun, is a real being exist
ing independently of the mind.

This same note is sounded

again when Plato brings up the matter of the Form causing the
reality of the individual beings.
The sun, I presume you will say, not only
furnishes to visib1es the power of visibility, but it also provides for their
generation and growth and nurture though
it is not itself generation • • • • In
like manner, then, you are to say that
the objects of knowledge not only receive
from the presence of the good their being
known, but their very existence and essence
is derived to them from it, though the
good itself is not essence but still
transcends essence in dignity and surpassing
power. 1S
There can be little doubt that Plato relied upon the doctrine
~~--------------~--

14
15

Ibid. 508e.
reId. 509c.

31
of the Ideagf good to explain his theory of morality, government, cosmology, epistemology and ontology.

He has insisted

constantly upon the absolute existence of the essences, upon
their causal aspect of man-kind in the fields of mental and
extra-mental reality.

It might be well to mention that cause

should not be taken as the efficient cause, for nowhere is
Plato clear enough for us to draw that conclusion.

There is a

temptation to claim such causality for the Idea of good, but
two difficulties stand in the way.

The word cause can be taken

in the sense of exemplary cause at all times, and the quality
of efficient causality is attributed by Plato to the O~~lOUPYO~.
With this explanation behind us, the examination of
Aristotle's arguments for rejecting
ceed.

~ato's

doctrine mew pro-

In the Ethics Aristotle presents three main objections

to Plato.

The first, to which there are three parts, is based

on the transcendental nature of the concept of gpod; the second,
on the uselessness of the separately existing Form of good; and
the third, on the unattainability of a transcendent good.
With regard to the first, we must bear in mind what we
said above, namely, that the Idea of good is a unity, remaining
unchangeable.
good.

It must not take in several

diff~rent

types of

For did not Plato object to Meno's catalogue of goods?

The first part, then, of this argument presented in syllogistic
form would run: the concept of good contains in it an order of
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priority and posteriority.

But the Platonic doctrine of the

Idea does not conaain such an order.

Therefore, the Platonic

doctrine of the Form does not agree with the concept of good;
and, as a result, the Form as Plato conceives it does not exist.
Aristotle's proof of his major is very simple.

There is prior-

ity and posteriority between substance and accidents, the being
which exists in itself, and the being Which exists in something else.

But good can be predicated of both substance and

accidents.

Therefore, the concept contains in it an order of

priority and posteriority.

With regard to the minor, Aristotle

appeals to Platonic doctrine and gives an immediate proof with
regard to the lack of a single Idea for numbers.

It must be

noted, however, that Aristotle means a particular type of number.

It is the Ideal number of which Aristotle says that they

stand in essential and immutable succession to and dependence
on each other; and, therefore, can be brought under no common
Idea. 16
In the second part of the argument Aristotle alters his
view point slightly and takes as his cue Plato's insistence
upon the unchangeableness of the Idea.

A single and universal

concept, Aristotle says, may not be predicated of more than
one category.
categories.

But the concept of the good transcends all the
Therefore, the concept of good is not a single,
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universal concept.

For a proof to this major, which Aristotle

here presupposes, we must turn to another work of his, the
Metaphysics, where he insists that
IllUS

A6yo~

(universal definition)

t be unchanging and always of the same comprehension.
There is no destruction of the formula in
the sense that it is ever in course of
being destroyed ••.•• If then demonstration
is of necessary truths and definition
is a scientific process, and if • • •
demonstration and definition cannot vary
thus, • • • clearly there can neither
be definition of nor demonstration about
sensible individuals. 17

Now in predicating the universal good of sUbstance and quality
(universality is basic to definition), the concept must undergo
a "destruction," at least in the note oOf "inseity" or "inalei ty.'
Hence such a universal concept is impossl. ble.

His minor stands

proven in the fir st part of the argument and again we find the
conclusion that the Ideas are impossible.
The final argument in this group, based upon the universality of concepts, proceeds in the following manner.
single idea must be the object of a single science.

A

But the

Idea of good is not a single idea, for it is not the object
of a single science.

Therefore, there is no Idea of good.

Of

the two premises here used, the second is easier to grasp, for
evidently the good can be the object of Ethics, Politics, flutep~aying,

17

~:

and so on through all the fields of science.
1039b , 20 - 1040&, 7.

As for th

first premise, a good bit of doubt overshadows it.

It is

true that the science of every universal idea has its own formal object.

But this does not mean that it might not be in-

cluded in the field of another science.

The sciences of

ship-building, carpentery, shoe-making, strategy, and human
conduct - each the possessor of its own formal object - is
possessed by the science of Politics. 18 P1~to is not unlike
Aristotle in this; for admitting the individual fields of
science, he would still form a super-science (~EXVD apXl~ex
~OVlX~)

Which he calls dialectics embracing all inferior

sciences.19

The argument, therefore, would not seem to do

,

justice to Plato and is itself inconsistent with Aristotle s
other ideas.
The second major argument rests on the fmtility of such
a sye tem.

It may be claimed, that Platonists might say, that

there is a difference between the Idea of good, which is absolute, and the individual goods in the wprld; that the universal good is more an object of the aya~~a~ov ~rov simply
because it is more enduring.

But Aristotle shows that no

matter how much more lasting it be, it is still notgenerically
------------~------~
18
Eth. Nic.: 1094 a , 1-17; 30.
19 Grent~lexander: The Ethics of Aristotle Illustrated with
Essays and Notes, Longmens, Green and Co., London, l87~
v 1, 43g;- "This argument is certainly unsatisfactory if
applied to Plato's point of view. Plato would say dialectic is the science of the Idea of good, and in this all
other science find their meeting-point. Even of the ~pax
~ov a~eov it might be said that according to Aristotle's
own account it falls (in all its manifestations, whether
as means or ends) under the one supreme science - Politics."
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different.
during.

The White is not whiter because it is more en-

If this is the only argument that can be brought

up in the defense of the Ideas, then they are useless and it
is futile to defend them.

For the result would be that, since

there is no difference between the two, between the absolute
and phenomena, there is no need of multiplying beings unnecessarily.

Hence, we might

s~

that Aristotle's argument in this

case is founded upon the principle of "sufficient reason."
There must be a sufficient reason for every being's existence
which is not found in the Form of good.

Therefore, there

should not be an unnecessary multiplication of beings by postulating the existence of the Idea of good.
Furthermore, taking the objects of this Form of good,
there seams to be a great discrepancy_

For the Form of good

does not embrace all good in the same way.

Some are called

good because of their relation to the formal good.

Hence,

these latter would be called good by analogy, either by the
similarity they have to the good or by their relation either
as cause or effect of the good.

In this case, the Idea is

not a perfect unity and cannot be posited as the object of man's
activity.
Finally, Aristotle says that the Idea of good is useless
for man; for, as Plato admits, it is an absolute reality, separated from all individuals.

Now the final end of man is the

acquisition and possession of happiness.

If,

howe~er,

the
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good cannot be possessed, it is a useless and and not, in
any way, to be put down as man's objective.
We can see, then, the different aspects under which
Aristotle objects to the Ideas.

First, it is not ontologically

possible; secondly, it is logically impossible; third, it is
useless in the science of Ethics.

The;objection he raises in

regard to the formal object of science seems to me to carry
little weight, because he does not consider Plato on his own
grounds.

His metaphysical arguments are sound; but they can

hardly be pronounced original.

Plato brings out the useless-

ness of the Form for man's cognition and thus approaches the
last of Aristotle's arguments.

He also criticizes them on

the point of multiplying beings unnecessarily.

Parmenides

forces Socrates into the admission that there would have to be
an infinite number of Ideas.
But so much for Plato and Aristotle.

There are other

objections the la $t~!"r' must handle, but this is done easily
and quickly.

Several qualities or activities of man were se-

lected by various men in which must happiness be s aid to exist.
Such are pleasure, riches, honor, virtue, and health.

With a

brief consideration of each, Aristotle drops them by the way-sidE.
Pleasure must be discarded, because it is a life suited for cattle and because it is not in accordance with the higher faculties of man.

Honor is too superficial, for it depends upon

those Who confer the honor; nor is it a good proper to the
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possessors fva ~La~euawal £au~oo~ ayaeoo~ eTvaL. 19

Also,it

is only a means, at best, of being sure that one possesses
virtue.

Virtue, itself, cannot be happiness; for, as we have

seen, it is a habit and may be possessed while asleep. In
addition, a virtuous man in suffering misery and misfortune
would not be accounted happyl
With this, Aristotle has completed his defense of happiness as he understands it.

With the philosophers who have

preceded him, he disagrees either because of their superficiality or because of the inherent difficulties with their system.

After discarding their proposals, he offers his own

answer to the perennial difficulty, backing it up with solid
proof.

19

~. ~.: l095b , 27.

CHAPTER IV
ARISTOTLE MAKES HAPPINESS CONTEMPLATION
The last two chapters have dealt with Aristotle's method
of arriving at the conclusion that the final end of man is happiness.

This treatment has Shown how he concludes to the same

doctrine as the thinkers who have preceded him.

It also shows

how Aristotle, differing in his method of discussion, comes
to his conclusion by the use of metaphysical argumentation.
Ignoring the arguments drawn from custom and universal persuasion, but employing the principle of finality with respect to
the functions of man, he concludes that happiness is man's
final end.

In addition, with this same argument, he proves

that happiness is not a matter of superficial enjoyment of
money, pleasure, leisure, health, or freedom from worry; nor
that it is Plato's Form of good; but that it is the operation
or "active exercise of the soul in accordance with virtue, or
if there are several, in accordance with the highest of these."
Now it remains to analyse this definition to find out
wnat meaning Aristotle places in each of the words he includes
in it.

We shall begin with the major division and work to its

fine points.
n soul;"

The first to be treated will be "activity;" then

next "virtue fI and the type s of vir tue; finally, "'in

accordance wi th t he highest virtue. tt
38

When this has been done,
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we can say that we have made an honest attempt to enter into
Aristotle's mind and understand the depth of his thought on
this greatest of all moral problems.

Then, only one thing re-

mains - to evaluate, in some degree, Aristotle's entire thesis
under the light of later philosophical and theological doctrines.
To begin, we must consider the expression, Itactive exercise. 1t

This active exercise, or activity, constitutes the

generic aspect of Aristotle's definition.

By this phrase he

wishes to distinguiSh happiness from mere existence.
is not mere

~,

Happiness

actus primus, but actio, actus secundus.

A man does not fulfill his purpose in life by merely existing.
He must make use of this existence in some type of activity.
The case is similar to the three men in Scripture who received
the talents.

He who buried his was satisfied with existence.

The two who used theirs with good results received the rewara.
The first got only reproach and condemnation.

So, too, Aris-

totle wishes to show that existence is insufficient.
In addition, by activity Aristotle does not mean 50va~l~

or mere faculty.

,

#

He intends evepyela which is the actus

secundus of the faculty.

If the faculty were dormant, the pro-

blem would resolve again into one of mere existence - useless.
Therefore, the conclusion is that the

Evepyela.

50va~l~

must become

Happihess must be something vital, living, non-dor-

mant. It is well to note that happiness is not truth; but is
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the act of a being in possessing this truth.

The latin,

possessio veritatis, brings out the idea because £ossessio not
only denotes having

~

thing but also connotes the active having,

the activity on the part of the possessor in holding onto the
object possessed.

It is the difference between

and possessio

between the active voice and the passive

~,

~

possessa

voice.
There Bre, however, various types of activity; but only
one which can be called happiness.

For this reason, Aristotle

insists that it must be found in the soul of man.

Happiness

must be found in the part of man which differentiates man from
the beast.

With this word he excludes the pleasures that may

be had by the activity of the body.

Exercise, com£ort, food,

the procreative act, all yield pleasure; but they do not constitute happiness.

There is more in happiness than these can

give; something that calls upon the soul and which will constitute human happiness, not animal pleasure.

It may be noted

here that these animal pleasures are not mocked by Aristotle.
In fact, he recognizes that they can increase happiness but only
in an accidental and entirely unessential way.

But happiness

is in the higher part of man and is an accidens proprium of man
provided that man fulfills the conditions required.
Aristotle includes the term virtue among the essential
notes of happiness.

Then he defines and distinguishes it.
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There are several virtues, he tells us.

Virtues of the mind

and virtues of the will; intellectual virtues and moral virtues.
Are all of these to be implied in the words of the definition?
It cannot be said that Aristotle holds they must.

It would

be only a matter of interpreting the general trend of Aristotelian thought if we maintained that Aristotle intended all the
virtues to be included.
mus~ ~e

For he expressly states that happiness

in accordance with the highest virtue.

However, it

would seem to be against that same general trend if we excluded
all the virtues except the highest.

Eor Aristotle is seeking

the perfect man and the perfect man must have all virtues.
The division of virtues has been mentioned: the moral
virtues, which pertain to the will, and the intellectual virtues
Which pertain to the acquisition of truth.
virtue

He defines moral

~pe~~ ~alX~)

as a state of character concerned with
choice, lying in a mean. l Moral virtues is a esl' which facilitates, by reason of the repetition, the performance of good acts

acts in harmony with the nature of man.

The~,

or that which

is good for man, is to be debermined by practical wisdom about
which we shall shortly speak.
The intellectual virtues

(ape~~ OlaYO~lx~)

are states

of mind concerned with knowing truth; and the list of these
virtues is established by the objectum formale of their activity

-------------------a

1

~.!!£.

1107 , 1.
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Thus, they can be classified under the following headings:
practical truth, or 10lowledge of how to secure the ends of human life; art, or knowledge of how to mrure things; intuitive
reason, or knowledge of the principles from which science proceeds; science, or demonstrative knowledge of the necessary
and eternal; and philosophic wisdom, the union of intuitive
reason and science. 2
Aristotle has an excellent reason for discussing virtue
and for including all of the types in the definition of happiness.

Through free will it is possible for man to use the

faculties not only

xa~a ~UcrlV

must be an activity
while vice napa
virtue.

but also

xa~a ~ucrll;and,

~U~lV,

~apa ~UcrlV.

since virtue is

Happiness
xa~a ~UcrlV

happiness must be in accordance with

In this way, Aristotle shows that the ultimate end

of man is in harmony with man's nature.

This phrase, "in accor-

dance with," sets the standard or norm by which man is to opel"ate
and function.
Moral virtues are to enter into happiness in the function
of hand-maidens.
mind's helpers.

Temperance, courage, even-temper are the
\Vhen one practices them, the intellect is un-

shackled from the earthiness usually attributed to men.

It is

the function of moral virtue to 'nsure the smooth and unimpede d
operation of the intellect by removing the internal personal
obstacles in the character.

-------------------Eth. Nic. 1139b , 15

2

- 1141a, 19.

Intellectual virtues, on the other hand, have a function
in happiness proper to each phase of truth.
be found in the good state of the mind.

Happiness must

Now, Aristotle tells

us that trof the intellect which is contemplation, not practical
nor productive, the good and the bad state are truth and falsity
respectively.u3

To insure the good state of the intellect, that

is, to insure truth, it is necessary to use the intellect with
certain rules of logic (which Aristotle sets forth in his Analytica Priora and Posteriora).

It is the function of all the

intellectual virtues to apply these rules and principles of
thought.
piness.

But each virtue has its own proper function in hapAs stated above, there

~e

five virtues of the mind:

practical wisdom, art, science, intuitive reason, and philosophic wisdom.

The purpose of practical wisdom is to supply

-

the knowledge of the mean in determining the moral virtues.
This is to what he refers when Aristotle defines moral virtues
by saying:
Birtue, then, is a state of char~cter concerned with choice lying in a mean, i.e., the
mean relative to us, this being determined by
a rational principle, and by that principle
by which themsn of practical wisdom would
determine it.4
It is the part of

pr~ctical

wisdom to determine and appoint

the middle between the two extremes involved in every virtue.
Thus it can be said that practical wisdom or prudence

--------------------

3
4

Ibid~

Ibid.

1139a,27~

1107 a , 1.
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is secondary to the higher faculty of philosophic wisdom, because Aristotle conceives of prudence as a hand-maid.

It is

the purpose of prudence to claar away in:ternal difficulties
to give the other faculty time and opportunity to achieve its
own end.

By helping man to accomplish his internal functi?ns,

overcome his

~nternal

difficulties and this in as smooth and

efficient way as possible, more leisure will be accorded contemplation.

Theophrastus has brought out this operation of

prudence very well in a fragment preserved by one of the
schomiasts and reprinted by Burnet.
Prudence bears itself to wisdom as
the slaves of the masters, who have
the care of everything, are related
to the despots; for these do everything that must be done in the house
in order that their masters may have
leisure for their free pursuits, while
prudence accomplishes all the practical
thingsin order that wisdom may have
time for the contemplation of the most
refined things. 5
Next, it is the function of art to supply the necessarie
of life.

One must remember that art is here used not for the

knowledge of painting, music, and sculpture, the so-called
fine arts, alone •. It refers to any activity that has transient
action as its aim.

Hence, it means carpentery, baking, shoe-

making, as well as flute-playing and dancing.

Now, art fits

into the scheme of happiness by providing the leisure necessary
for contemplation.

-------------------John: The
5
Burnet~
Co. l~OO

As the moral virtues under the dictates of
Ethics bf Aristotle, London, Methuen and
a footnote.

50~114~a
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practical reason remove all the obstacles to contemplation
which may be found in one's character, or emotional or voluntary mru{e-up, so too, art removes all the obstacles which may
exist in the environment.

For example, it provides 'the food,

clothing, and physical care of the body which may be necessary
for sound intellectual operation.
out of penury and misery.

It keeps the individual

In this way, art insures smooth

operation by eliminating external distraction.
Science and intuitive reason must combine to present
the ideae objectivae for contemplation.

It is the purpose

of

these two virtues to amass, so to speak, the great body of
truth which the last faculty will contemplate.

Intuitive rea-

son has the task of collecting all the primitive truths; While
science will draw certain conclusions about necessary beings
by reasoning from the primitive truths.

Finally, these virtues

arragge this body of truth into one unified system -

~

master-

piece.
Aristotle inserts a conditional clause into his definition: "if there are several virtues, in accordance with the
highest."
soul.
clause.

There are, as we have seen, several virtues of the

Now we must find the application of this conditional
Aristotle means by this, that, although all virtue

is necessary to

h~piness,

philosophic wisdom.

the essential virtue is that of

He says that happiness must be in accor-
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dance with the higheat virtue.

The reason is that happiness

must be the highest end and the rational place to posit happiness would be in the operation of the highest faculty.

Now,

philosophic wisdom is the highest of the virtues "for philosophic wisdom is scientific knowledge, combined with intuitive
reason, of the things that are the highest by nature."S

It

contains the matter that the intellect will;contemplate as a
finished product, perfect in all its detall and unified into
one whole picture.
Happiness, then, is the unimpeded pursuit of the intellectual life in the knowledge and possession of immortal truth unimpeded because it has been unshackled from error and mental
sloth by the incorporation of the moral and intellectual virtues
It is the only occupation of man that is truly worthy of his
nature.

It is, too, the only activity that is most self-suffi-

cient and independent of the other needs of life.

To be able

to withdraw from all the confusion of everyday life and to
concentrate on the things that are noble and ennobling is
claimed by Aristotle to be the peak of human attainment.

This

activity is the only one which can take man out of himself and
raise him to the level of divinity.
Whether it be reason or something else
that is this element Which is thought
to be our na tural ruler and gu ide and
to take thought of things noble end divine, whether it be itself also divine
_______________ Qr_Q~ly the most divine element in us,
S

~~.

1141b , 2.

Cf. also 1141&, 19.
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the activity of this in accordance with
its proper virtue will be perfect happiness. 7
Therefore the activity of God, which surpasses all others in blessedness, must
be contemplative; and of human activities,
therefore, that which is most akin to this
must be most of the nature of kappiness. 8
But such a life would be too high for man;
for it is not in so far as he is man that
he will live so, but in so far as something
divine is present in him. 9
Once again Greek thought has made happiness a gerov
into the word

£o6al~ovta

~L

ald

injected the ancient and original

meaning of a god-given gift

(eo-6aio~aL).

To one the least bit acquainted with Catholic philosophical thought, many of these statements will

~pear

truisms,

but the fact is that they are giant strides toward perfect
truth.

Aristotle, in unison with Plato, claims for man kin-

Ship with God by participation in tntelligence.

The;soulof

man endowed with intellect is become an image of God in a way
that, as far as man's nature can demand, is perfect.

In the

second last quotation, Aristotle reaches the ultimate in the
natural know&edge of God. True, there are refinements he has
overlooked, but to say that contemplation in God surpasses all
other activities in blessedness takes man to the threshold of
revelation.

The next step is the knowledge of the Trinity.

For in this contemplation, the knowledge of God in contem7
8
9

Ibid. 1177R, 13.
Ibid. 1178b , 21.
Ibid. 1177b , 25.
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plating himself generates the Son, and the love between the
two is the spiration of the Holy Ghost. We could never expect Aristotle to attain this conclusion, but we must make
note of the intelligence of a pagan which is so nearly Catholic.
Aristotle feels tlmt he has done a slight injustice to
the opinions of certain people by rejecting pleasure as the
synonym for happiness.

Realizing men are undoubtedly seeking

pleasure, he finds a place for pleasure in happiness.

Not the

pleasures of the sense, to be sure, but the pleasures of the
soul.

Happiness, he insists, is not defined by pleasure.

But

happiness does have an accidens proprium, a quality that is
not of the essence of happiness but which is so closely connected with happiness, that where happinews is, pleasure must
also be.
Vfuether, then, the perfect and supremely
happy man has one or more activities, the
pleasures that perfect these will be said
in the strict sense to be pleasures proper
to man, and the rest will be so in a secondary ~Bd fractional way, as are the activities.
It seems out of place to criticize a system so well
formulatea and so close to actual truth.

But it is necessary

to point out a few flaws in a doctrine so well articulated.
They are minor ones but, nevertheless, they leave the doctrine
incomplete.
10

Ibid.

Aristotle seems to pass over a difficulty that
1177b , 31.
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Plato had foreseen.

Supposing a man really achieves the

heights that Aristotle postulates.

There is still;lacking com-

plete self-sufficiency, and consequently an essential note
of happiness.

Aristotle seems to claim that man will approach

this complete severance from all extrinsic aids as a mathematician would speakof one line approaching Slother line as a
limit.

But there must be complete independence.

Hence, in

this present life, where man is always dependent upon some comfort, upon food, friendship, social relations, these always
manage to disturb the quiet of contemplation.
Secondly, not even the greatest minds can completely
fathom truth; and there must always be an unsatisfied desire
to know more.

At the

s~e

time there will be the disquieting

knowledge and conviction that something will mar the contemplation, at least deathl
As has been said, Plato foresaw this difficulty and for
this reason remained unsettled in his conclusion.

The final

words of the Philebus reveal this disturbing thought:
Nothing could be more satisfactorily shown
than the insufficiency of both of them
[wisdom and pleasure] • • • • • In this argument
the claims of both of pleasure and mind
to be the absolute good have alike been set
aside, because they have both failed in
self-sufficiency or adequacy or perfection.ll
Another difficulty ought to be proposed.
----------~---------

11

Philebus: 67a.

According to
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Aristotle's demands, the state of happiness can be acquired
by only a few men.

The rest of man*kind would have to go

along suffering hardships and trials to end up without having
acquired their final end and, What is more, being incapable
of acquiring it.

They would have an existence the end of which

was impossible of attainment.

This is contrary to Aristotle's

idea because he insists, in his criticism of Plato, that the
end must be capable of attainment.

He would have to admit that

most of the human race would enter life, live in it, and pass
out of it without ever having acquired the state of happiness.
Then there could not be the application of his own principle,
o~eev

yap

~4~~v ~ ~uo,~ ~o,er.

One final step would have eliminated the whole difficulty
a step which Aristotle comes close to taking, but which is never
definitely made - the immortality of the soul.

Had he included

this last step, there could have been no reason for complaint.
It would have been a simple thing for him to put happiness into
the life of the soul after death, where there would have been
no need of food, clothing, companions, justice, passions, or
all the things that disturb.

There would have been a perfect

self-sufficiency, as well as that continued possession of happiness without fear of losing it.

There would have been, too,

the possibility of everybody's attaining that ultimate end
by the pursuit of virtue while dwelling in this human habitation
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There must necessarily be a note of regret that neither
he nor Plato concluded to such a rational statement.

They

both had in their body of thought all the ground for making
such a conclusion.

They were highly tempted to; and they had

the conviction of mankind leaning in that direction.
stopped them is just a matter of conjecture.

But what

It is not en easy

thing, nor a logical thing, to say that they purposely refrained
from the conclusion.

The best

e~lanation

seems to be man's

fallible intellect, hampered by what these men devoted their
lives to ostracize from society, the pull made by fallen nature
against man's true nature.
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